“Terrorism can never be accepted. We must fight it together, with methods that do not compromise our respect for the rule of law and human rights, or are used as an excuse for others to do so.” – Anna Lindh

“You can get much farther with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone” – Al Capone.

As Max Boot writes in ‘Invisible Armies’, most insurgencies end up failing. Between 1775 and 1945 the rate of success including partial achievement was only about 25%, but since 1945 this rate has increased to about 45%. This increase can be attributed to the rising importance of Public opinion which the insurgents use skillfully to build a narrative that saps the will of the State to persist in its campaign and makes it see the insurgencies only as incidents or battles and not as a war that needs prolonged commitment.

As Lt. Col. David McCullen noted – No successful Counter Insurgency campaign has ever lasted less than 10 years. Hence it is essential to take a comprehensive and long term counter insurgency approach. In such conflicts success will not necessarily come out of attempting to defeat the Insurgents militarily.

This is evident from the result of ‘Operation Green Hunt’ undertaken by the ‘Greyhounds’, a Special Force raised from the Andhra Pradesh police, to ‘Look – Find and Eliminate’ the Naxals from the State. This operation succeeded, but only by driving the Naxals into the neighbouring States, where they regrouped and now have again begun operations in AP/Telangana.

The tendency of the political leadership to see such episodic military success as an end in itself is only self-deluding as it is only a means to the end. It needs to be immediately followed up by political and economic actions. Hence such conflicts should better be seen as political arguments for the loyalty of the population, as the centre of gravity of an Insurgency is well recognized as the ‘people and the politics’.

Keeping these measures in mind the following actions should be implemented at the earliest:

1. Make all efforts to isolate the insurgents from the local populations. For insurgents isolation is death. Get the locals to work with you by offering them proper security 24 / 7. Otherwise the threat of the Insurgents / Naxals will end up coercing the locals into ‘Cooperation’. Such security can only be provided by the Forces being there amongst them 24 / 7, in small outposts sited as to support each other, and undertaking heavy and frequent aggressive patrolling on foot. Encourage the locals especially the leaders and opinion makers to help in identifying and informing about the actual Naxalites/Insurgents and if deemed necessary also enroll them into local
   1. civil defense units / neighbourhood watch groups trained even if minimally, and armed as necessary, to work with the Military and Police, and pay them and recognize them. After all only the locals can really identify the insurgents. The necessity and advantage of employing locals in this manner must be systematized under laid down norms to avoid confusion about their role and unnecessary judicial wrangling by ill informed so called Human Rights Groups. A policy of “Clear and Retain” beats “Search and Destroy” any time. Work with the State administration to provide the locals, services such as Schools, Courts, Hospitals, Police stations and, allow them a say in their own affairs. (See ‘Counter Insurgency (COIN) Operations – The Do’s & Don’ts’).
   2. Recognize that they are different threats in different areas and that different groups have different agendas and therefore may need different approaches. Remain alert to divisions within the insurgents, encourage surrender, especially of those who are not dogmatic cadres (Reconcilables), by offering attractive & appropriate inducements and resettlement opportunities.

   The essential conditions for the recognition of such ‘Reconcilables’ and acceptance of their surrender must include;

   1. Public declaration of renunciation of the use of Force to attain an end and the surrender of all arms.
   2. Promise to work with the Security Forces to identify and reach out to or apprehend their erstwhile colleagues
   3. Come in with a Guarantor, who is subject to arrest if the Insurgent later disappears.
   4. Be willing to report to the designated Security Post any time told or called.
   6. Reconstruction and Economic Development:

   Security, synchronized with governance and economic development, will work provided the Government has the will to put in the great internal political effort required in the short term and also commit the funds required.

   In heavily Naxal / Insurgent infested areas especially if sparsely populated, it would really be more economical in the long term to identify and convince the non combatant population to move out from the areas, and resettling them into camps / nodal resettlement villages, and educate them of their rights, and of the procedures to obtain them, and take good care of them, while the evacuated area can then be more effectively patrolled and cleansed of hostiles. This will require proper explanation of the advantages, and right encouragement to the locals.

   Keep in mind that these people may be ignorant and their culture seemingly primitive, but they are not museum exhibits and should be given the opportunity to make an informed choice. Worldwide, people like them have always chosen to share the benefits of the modern world even as they duly adapt to allow retaining of those cultural elements they deem necessary.

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