In dealing with Insurgency/Naxalism, we should understand that such conflict arises from a sense of dissatisfaction and alienation of the local populations and has to be dealt with firmly and expeditiously in a manner as to bring them into the main stream. The strikes, or even the terrorist acts, resorted to by the Insurgents/Naxalites have to be understood properly and dealt with differently from what may seem similar acts of externally influenced and sponsored terrorists, who are mostly foreigners or those locals inspired and supported by foreign agencies and who are thus to be viewed as enemies.

The right strategy to defeat an insurgency is to understand the underlying causes, which may be different in different areas, and thus require different approaches, and to find ways to change the behaviour and attitude of the insurgents. This involves a combination of Military, Economic and Political / Social actions.

We need a balance between having too many forces and therefore contributing to the insurgency by conveying a feeling of occupation and, the risk of having too few and therefore having an ineffective security situation for the political process to go forward.

History of Counter Insurgency Operations in Malaya, Algeria, Philippines, Iraq etc, all teach us that to defeat an insurgency, you must protect the people and permanently separate / isolate them from the insurgents and to do so you have to live amongst and work with the local population, even house by house and family by family. This is more important, and to some extent easier in our case, as the Security Forces are domestic and not foreign.

It is most important, when it comes to dealing with Insurgency / Naxalism / Terrorism, to be clear on the intentions, on the ‘End

State’, and on the methods which will be implemented and to ensure that everyone involved are also clear on the same. This should be reflected in the Mission Statement, which could be say as:

“To conduct combat, and stability and support operations, in co-ordination with the local Police and Para-Military, to secure the population, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize the insurgents and gain the support of the locals in a fair and impartial manner, and transition responsibilities to the Police and State Administration at the earliest”.

Militarily – we must move deliberately and maintain a robust presence in the area until we have firmly established Joint Security Stations, manned by the local police alongside neighbourhood watches / civil defense groups / local militias, and can provide adequate protection for the population. Our operations must be deliberate, our goals achievable and sustainable. We will only be decisive when the security is sustained over time and enhance the prospects for reconciliation, and involve the locals in a speedy transition to the State / local Police and Administration. We must interdict accelerants of violence, continue the transition to State Police and Administration and ensure security, self reliance and enhance the prospects for reconciliation.

To allow rapid adaptation to local circumstances, the Junior Officers, and even the well trained soldiers, on the ground should be enabled and allowed to decide on how the aims set by the Senior Officers are best met. This decision making authority should not only be for tactical operations, but in counter insurgency operations also include discretion to fund local development efforts.

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