Also it should be made necessary that the local administration / police work with the Military to explain the need to the locals and educate them that they need to cooperate, to stop as when called up on to do so, as running away is generally construed as an admission of guilt and, to also trust the system to investigate and act upon any complaint of wrong doing by the Security Forces. The limits of such Disturbed Areas should be such as to deny the terrorists / insurgents the opportunity to move into adjacent areas and thus escape capture. The Disturbed Areas should be operationally contiguous and clearly demarcated. They

cannot be pockets of territory which are operationally un-viable.

3. Over sight:

The act of responding to a perceived threat situation begins even before full recognition and evaluation of the threat is completed. The initial and automatic response is a freeze, or flight, or fight response triggered by an adrenaline rush. In order to be able to respond suitably, it is essentially that the response is very quick and appropriate (it is better to be safe than sorry and many times an overreaction to a mistaken threat perception is better than being late in response in order to be sure).

In Counter Insurgency (COIN) Operations killing the enemy is easy. Finding and identifying him, beyond even ‘reasonable doubt’, let alone ‘beyond all doubt’ is often nearly impossible. The fact remains that a Insurgent / Naxalite / Terrorist wears no recognizable uniform and can only be recognized and confirmed as one if he / she is filmed in action or is caught with a Weapon / IED in his / her possession. If he / she is able to throw the weapon etc away and merges into a crowd without being filmed or photographed in action, it would be impossible for those not actually in that action, to prove beyond all doubt that he / she is a Insurgent / Naxalite / Terrorist etc. In any such case it should be made amply clear in advance that the benefit of any doubt will be given to the Forces (Police, Para Military or Military), though an internal investigation may be ordered, if deemed necessary.

To ensure proper oversight and investigation of the operations of the Security Forces and of their actions in any operation, a division / department can be constituted within the appropriate Ministry, on the lines of the US Police Department’s Internal Affairs Department, to investigate into accusations of Human Rights abuses / use of excessive or inappropriate force, and to recommend appropriate action. Some sort of Departmental reporting and de – briefing may even be made routine in all cases of firing and the authority concerned be authorized to either okay it or order an enquiry as considered above. The existing authorities, now partially empowered for such duties, should be absorbed into such an internal affairs department.

Such a procedure should, to a great extent, allay the fears of any reasonable minded civil liberties activists that no attempt to subvert due procedure is being made. It will also allow the Forces to undertake their tasks as best as they can, and as per their training, without the fear of being unfairly targeted even in righteous incidents let alone justifiable accidents, and with the confidence of being overseen or judged only by their peers – people with experience of such situations.

In war, or war like scenarios, where split second decisions are to be taken and acted upon by the Personnel of the Forces, we have to trust that the selection procedures and the extensive training we put them through will

hone their instincts and enable them to make the best possible decision and react accordingly in that situation, when over thinking may lead to slower reaction and hence to injury or even death not only to themselves but also to people for whose security they are responsible. In other situations, outside the circle of competence attained through their training, slow and rational thinking can be resorted to.

The post event critics, with the benefit of hindsight and without the urgency of immediate action / reaction, in fact with the option to also replay the scenario to suit new ideas or information, should not be allowed to endanger the Forces by tying their hands with the unjust threat of civil / judicial action. In Law everyone has a right to be tried by his / her peers. People who have never had to face such situations cannot really be allowed to act as ‘jury’ / ‘critics’ of those who have. Even in Sports we do not really accept that one who has never played the game can be an umpire or even a proper critic of that game. A proper understanding of the Geneva Conventions will help clarify the distinction between ‘Enemy Soldiers’ and ‘Enemy Combatants’ / Terrorists or Spies. Politicians and other local leaders, seeking short term benefits, must not be allowed to guide the response of the Security Forces. The fact that only a very small percentage of the alleged misdeeds of the Security Forces finally stand up to scrutiny, and that on such cases appropriate action has been taken by the authorities without delay, proves the point.

In such conflicts it is not only necessary to win but it is also necessary to use the victory to bring about long term peace and good order and it is at this time that magnanimity is called for, not during the conflict. Also calls for human rights or for development can only be addressed once hostilities are over or the hostiles have surrendered. It is necessary that we understand the present day attitude of the general public towards war / such hostilities and towards Soldiers / Security Forces to be able to better address their concerns for human rights abuses and make them understand the realities of functioning in hostile actions. (See ‘Public & Soldiers – How they view each other & War’).

4. Understanding Collateral Damage:

Collateral damage or loss is an unavoidable factor in any conflict. The aim is to reduce this to an acceptable level without calling for an unattainable ideal of ‘Zero’ levels of such damages / losses.

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