Economically, we must create a combination of near-term and long-term employment opportunities and improve basic services in order to generate economic growth in the region.

Politically, we must set benchmarks to address the dismantling of the militias of the insurgents, deal with and move towards provincial and local elections.

Clarity is required on:

1. Jurisdiction & Justice:
   1. Law & Order may be a State subject but when the perpetrators of crime cross State boundaries or use Central Organizations / Facilities (Postal Services, Railways, Interstate Phone/Mobile etc) to commit the terror act or crime, then it should rightly become a Central problem to be addressed by a centralized command and implementation hierarchy, through a local Head Quarters presence, which will interact with the Local Authority for any support necessary and keep the Local / State Administration (Chief Secretary) duly informed. (Learn from how the FBI and Homeland Security operate in the USA). This ensures a quick and appropriate response.

A suitably organized Central/National Investigation and Intelligence body should be setup to deal with all issues regarding intelligence gathering, investigating such terrorist acts or crimes and corruption / financial issues that cross State boundaries and react to terrorist strikes through a National Counter Terrorism Center. Such an organization can better coordinate necessary action and also be an answer to investigations that may at the same time include criminal, corrupt and / or terror elements and work with the CBI.

2. Recognize
   2. such perpetrators as being un- lawful and declare that strict and prompt action will be taken against all those involved in such activity, including local supporters.
   3. Lay down a policy of ‘No Negotiations’ unless violence is forsworn and weapons laid down. Ruthless killing of civilians is undertaken by the Insurgents / Naxals to use Human Rights activists to pressurize the authorities into a cease fire. Such cease fire periods are only used by the Insurgents / Naxals as a time for re-grouping and recovery. Hence once action is initiated, call for any sort of cease-fire should not be entertained. Of course cease-fire as a prelude to immediate surrender of arms and commencement of negotiation is the only exception.
   4. Lay down a policy of ‘No Exchange or Release of Prisoners’ for kidnap / hijack hostages. Any negotiations in such cases can only, if at all, be for cash, or in exchange for mitigation of charges, or allowing them to escape for then, to avoid further immediate casualities. Announcing such a policy in advance will act as a deterrent.

   “If we ever hope to rid the world of the political AIDS of our time, terrorism, the rule must be clear: one does not deal with terrorists; one does not bargain with terrorists; one kills terrorists.” – Meir Kahane.

   This if of course, easier said than done, as the Government always has a responsibility towards all its citizens, especially such innocent hostages. The best option is to eliminate the availability of such an exchange option to the terrorists by ensuring very speedy hearing and disposal of all terrorist cases, through Special Courts for that purpose (see below).

   5. Differentiate between the ‘Reconcilable’ and the ‘Irreconcilable’ Treat the ‘Reconcilables’ and other victims of the system differently. Set down procedures for speedy time bound trial of the irreconcilable Insurgents and Naxals and of the real Terrorists in Special Courts / Tribunals formed for this purpose. Since those who use weapons against the State are the Enemy warring against the State, such Courts / Tribunals and procedures can be based on the rules followed by Military Courts / Tribunals to try War Crimes etc suitably adapted for internal security purposes. Do not insist on proof beyond all doubt, only that beyond reasonable doubt in the circumstances. Also, as prevention is better than cure, proven suspicious activity needs to be recognized and those involved dealt with at the earliest – nipping the threat in the bud.

   Trials can also be conducted in specified Special Courts / Tribunals, ‘in camera’ for those who are not yet caught or are absconding or have taken refuge in other countries. Lawyers can be appointed as ‘friend of the accused’ to question the evidence against the accused and argue the case on his / her behalf in front of such a Court / Tribunal.

   Make it clear that a sentence pronounced by such a Court, even if after an ‘in camera’ proceeding and even when the sentence may also be confidential, be deemed

   legally binding and necessary orders can thereafter be issued as essential for its execution by Special Forces or Intelligence Teams.

   If deemed necessary the sentence pronounced by such Courts / Tribunals may be made subject to review / confirmation, in a time bound manner, by a Special Judicial body formed for that purpose before orders for execution of the sentence are passed.

   2. Operational Authority:

   In order to enable the Security Forces (especially the Military) to act effectively to resolve insurgency / terrorism issues, it is necessary that the Government must give adequate support and authority to its Military and Security Forces without undue interference and influence. To lay down in a clear and definable manner, the desired ‘End State’, and ensure that their ‘Rules of Engagement’ and ‘Operation’ be such as to allow them to take appropriate action as deemed fit by them in the circumstances, in order to ensure security. As such actions will, at most times, result in the curtailment of some of the rights and freedoms of the locals, the Security Forces will need special powers and protection. To avoid misuse of such powers it is essential that their application be limited and properly supervised.

   The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is applicable only in areas declared as ‘Disturbed Areas’ by the Government, especially the State Government, when they recognize that the conditions within that area are so ‘disturbed’ as not to allow the normal administrative and police machinery to function. In such circumstances more draconian measures are seen as being necessary to bring the situation under control, hence the AFSPA. The ‘End State’ for such special conditions must be laid out in advance and all efforts must be made to attain to such a state in the shortest possible time.

   In order to avoid local misunderstanding and political grandstanding it should be required that the designation of areas as ‘Disturbed Areas’ allowing for the application of such acts as the AFSPA, have a default ‘Sunset’ clause. Such ‘Disturbed Areas’ designation should by default lapse within say 24 months or a maximum of 3 years, unless specifically re-designated again as such by the State / Central legislatures at least 3 months prior to the lapse date. This will ensure that all the political parties share the responsibility for the results of such extension or denial thereof.

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