The DONT’s

“Negative knowledge (what not to do) is more potent than positive knowledge (what to do)” – Rolf Dobelli 

• Do NOT – Waste time and money attempting to build a police replica of the Army. Have local forces mirror the Insurgents not the Army.
• Do NOT – concentrate on big, capital-intensive reconstruction projects except where settling populations in townships

• as deemed necessary. In all other case, remember ‘small is beautiful’.
• Do NOT – just throw in just any or everyone to take up leadership of counter insurgency operations. As Lt. Col. David McCullon advises – “Not everyone is good at counter insurgency. Many people do not understand the concept, and some can’t execute it. It is difficult and, in a conventional force, only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few ‘naturals’ exist. Learn to spot these (individuals), put them in a position where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent – a few good men led by a smart junior (or) non commissioned officer can succeed in counter insurgency, where hundreds of well armed soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail”.
• Do NOT – Obsess on fighting your foe. Only attack him when he gets in the way. Try not to be distracted or forced into series of reactive moves by a desire to kill or capture the insurgents/hostiles.

“With strategies based on Terror – only Terrorists have a chance of winning” – Marc Stiegler

• Do NOT – launch a raid, or be provoked into over reacting in a ‘knee-jerk’ fashion into retaliatory action due to an automatic bias for action. Stop, think twice, consider its consequences and only then act properly and proportionately. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if the collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.
• DO NOT – let yourself be provoked. Often insurgents carryout a terrorist act or a guerilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing counter-insurgency forces to over react.
• Do NOT – try to do too much. Don’t make a move unless your presence is sustainable, and once you take an area, do not leave it uncovered or allow it to be re-infiltrated. Do NOT give up terrain.
• Do NOT – hesitate to put more troops into the fight to attain to the ‘End State’ at the soonest: trying to make do with fewer troops may only lead to more years of bleeding.
• Do NOT – hole up in safe compounds away from the locals and cede the initiative and appear to be running scared (as allegedly many did in Sri Lanka-OP Pawan?), you cannot offer Security by ‘day tripping’ like tourists, for perhaps 2 hours a day and leaving them unguarded and exposed, at the mercy and coercive attention of the Terrorists for the other 22 hours. You will, lose touch with the people, lose situational awareness, and appear to be running scared and cede the initiative to the insurgents. To feel secure the people need to know that the COIN Forces are there with them and accessible 24 / 7. Remember people are the ‘Prize’ and are the ultimate arbiters of Victory, and that it is our interest to isolate the insurgents from the people as, for the insurgents, such isolation is death. Take up a residential approach; living in your

• sector in close proximity to the population, moving on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling – all these seem more dangerous than they really are. People will be more willing to talk freely in the nights.
• DO NOT – rely too much on or be obsessed with high technology. It isolates you from the locals.
• Do NOT – abuse your prisoners, or tolerate abusive behavior by others to strive to encourage them to change sides. (Remember how well we treated even the Pak POW’s in 1972 though we did not publicize such treatment and hence lost a chance to enhance goodwill). Treat detainees professionally, with dignity and justice, and publicize their treatment. At no time detain family members to compel suspected insurgents to surrender or provide information. Strive to get them to encourage the hostiles to change sides.
• Do NOT – even during a raid, humiliate the locals, or needlessly destroy property or otherwise alienate the local population from the ‘End State’ goals of the overall campaign. Apologize, if necessary and make generous compensation for any unavoidable damage.
• Do NOT – take relatives or even the suspected associates of suspected insurgents hostage, in an attempt to compel surrender or coerce information, because it both illegal and unethical, in addition to being counterproductive in the long run. Be prepared to show the evidence justifying any detention. Every time you treat a local disrespectfully, you are working for the insurgents.
• Do NOT – try to measure success by metrics such as, number of incidents or casualties, or amount of money spent, or even number of troops on ground etc. If at all you need a metric try to devise one that measures the attitude of the people towards the Security Forces. Winning the war and losing the peace can only soon lead to more war.
• Do NOT – forget the “Paradoxes of Counter Insurgency” as highlighted in ‘Military Review’ by E. Cohen, C. Crane, Lt. Col J. Horvath and Lt. Col. J. Nagl, such as;

– “The more you protect your Force, the less effective you are” – meaning that you must get out amongst the population, because in the long run that is the only way to improve Security.

– “The more force you use, the less effective you are” – meaning that restraint, whenever possible, is the best way to re-establish the rule of Law. Aim for ‘Normalcy’.

– “Sometimes doing nothing, at that time, is the best reaction” – meaning that getting provoked into retaliatory or hasty action may, at that time, be counterproductive.

• Do NOT – end up doing the RIGHT thing the WRONG way!

Conclusion:

In Counter Insurgency (COIN) Operations it is as much a folly to think that the solution lies only in the use of Military Force as it is to think that programmes to win over the locals and thus isolate the insurgents can be implemented without first militarily attaining a level of security for the people. The success lies in knowing how

to balance these two conflicting requirements. Hence the policies should be Military and Politico – Economic and both short term & long term.

– JAI HIND! –

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