Key concepts:

• Counter Insurgency (COIN) is the comprehensive civilian and military effort taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and thereby address its root causes.
• In dealing with any insurgency we need to remember that the time scale of counter-insurgency is simply too long. We need to be clear about our objectives and the methodology to be followed to attain to the desired ‘End State’. If we are not winning, then we are losing. We are then in the midst of a low grade, prolonged civil war.
• We should be clear on our strategy – what is it that we are trying to do? How are we trying to do it – that is, what course of action to pursue? What sorts of resources – people, time, and money – are likely to be required to reach those goals? One good way to undertake such a review would be to seek out dissenting views, probing differences inside the administration, especially those between civilian and military officials and then arriving at the actions to be taken.

“Haziness about ends and means, about what to do and how to do it, is a mark of strategic ineptitude; in war it gets you killed” – Dr. Elliot Cohen 

“Short term approach to long term problems generate multiple short term plans that often confuse activity with progress” – Col. H.R. McMaster

Don’t let hope posing as a plan be your strategy. If you can’t explain your campaign plan, you probably don’t have one. We need a real strategy built around the principles of counter insurgency warfare as recognized in the many such campaigns in the past and as so succinctly put by those who tackled the insurgency in Iraq.

• There should be clear ‘Rules of Engagement (ROE)’ and a clear vision of an attainable ‘End State’ before we engage in any action.

ROE which call for – not opening fire till fired upon or till the enemy is positively identified beyond all doubt and having undisputed proof of his intentions, are unimplementable and represent a danger to the soldiers

and also undermine their confidence in battle and even makes them disheartened and even hesitant, with disastrous conclusions. The Government and the people should trust in the training given to their soldiers and leave it to them to decide and act appropriately in the Field. Of course they need to have internal systems to investigate and deal with any aberrations. As far as is practical, the troops should not be locals, however knowledge of local language and customs should be encouraged.

Troops should be positioned for at least two years, to allow them to develop ground knowledge and to buildup local contacts and any handing over should be done over a period of about 3 months to allow for it to be done properly.

As Thomas E. Ricks writes in ‘The Gamble’ – “The aim of a counter insurgency campaign is to destroy the (Insurgent), – but often by isolating him and making him irrelevant, rather than just hunting down and killing him. The best insurgent is not a dead one, who might leave behind a relative seeking vengeance, but one who is ignored by the population and perhaps is contemplating changing sides bringing with him invaluable information.”

Hence the corner stone of any COIN (Counter Insurgency) effort is not just to locate and kill the insurgents but to win over the locals and to protect them and provide them sustainable security and opportunities for earning a livelihood and to isolate the real insurgents from them. Non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect.

As Gen. George Casey Jr . wrote – “The potential second and third-order effects, however, can turn a raid (that captures or kills a known insurgent) into a long-term defeat if our actions humiliate the family, needlessly destroy property, or alienate the local population from our goals.” We therefore need to teach our officers not just what to think, but how to think.

We should always remember that:

• It will not be easy to take on an insurgency, but hard is not hopeless.

Since WW-II, no major Power has been able to defeat an Insurgency militarily anywhere in the world. The total record is something like 23 to 0, or 21 to 2 if the British are considered as Winners in Malaya, even if this was more a Political than an Military victory, and the Sri Lankans over the LTTE, who lost perhaps because they made the mistake of trying to fight like a regular Army defending Territory. Hence the policies should be Military and Politico – Economic and both short term & long term. This will require greater commitment of both, the Forces and of all resources, than visualized at first and we should be ready to do so.

• Treating and fighting insurgency as if it was a conventional war is inefficient and counterproductive. No successful COIN campaign has ever lasted less than 10 years.
• The Insurgents/Naxals/Maoists take control of an area and then work to turn it into a paying concern by intimidation and

• violence. They create a fear psychosis by killing or humiliating any dissenters into submission.
• For insurgents the War is total, while for the State it is limited though necessarily brutal, and hence the need to be clear on what we should Do and what we should Not Do.

Pages: 1 2 3 4