The alertness, the quick response, the courage and determination of all those involved in driving these two terrorists into a situation where one terrorist could be captured was exemplary and needs to be duly recognized, especially the Officer at CAMA Hospital, the other Police men injured in properly engaging the Terrorists and of course ASI Tukaram Gopal Omble.

By then all the other 8 terrorists were within the two Hotel complexes, the Taj and the Oberoi, and in the Nariman/Chabad House. All of which were duly surrounded by the Police. BUT –

• Did they, perhaps with the help of the BMC (Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation), put up proper barricades at a reasonable distance (say 50 to 100 mtrs where possible) as they always do for political rallies etc? – NO
• Did they properly regulate the entry and exit and allow for proper movement of the Fire Department, BMC and Security Forces vehicles? – NO, not really.
• Were there any people or procedures in place to identify, record and interrogate the people who came out of the buildings, and guide them to safety? – NO. lnfact many were confused and went back in, to their subsequent death.
• Was there any senior and proper person at or near the site to coordinate action, reassure the people and, at regular intervals, to address the Media? – NO.
• Ofcourse, some level of individual Departmental level coordination from their respective Head Quarters was evident but it was obviously not adequate.
• The Municipal Corporation claimed to be waiting to be called upon.
• The Fire Services were also, waiting to be asked what else they could do.
• Staff at some of the major Hospitals in the area, were also, waiting to be called upon.
• The Media too was trying to find someone who could give even partial answers and explanations for what they were witnessing.

Someone reacted correctly and called up the MARINE COMMANDOS (MARCOS). But someone else higher up, obviously interfered and when the MACROS arrived at the site, almost within an hour or so of the hotels and Chabad house being occupied, there was no appropriate Authority to sign or even give their Offcial order to move in, take action and even fire as necessary to clear the buildings of the hostiles, – a well-established legal requirement laid down by the Government, without which the Military is not authorized to proceed.

In short, overall Command, Control, Coordination and Leadership was missing. No one wanted to take the responsibility in case of greater than anticipated casualties amongst the hostages and guests and inmates.

But inaction is worse than some mistakes that may be committed during action. It was such inaction or only minimal and hesitant action that allowed the terrorists free rein to kill some of those who were victims within the first few minutes and the many others in the subsequent hours of entering the buildings, well before the time the National Security Guards (NSG) took to arrive at the site and took charge. The casualties would have been far less and the whole operation over much sooner, had the Naval Marine Commandos (MARCOS) been duly authorized to take action as necessary to deal with the
Terrorists at the very beginning of this crisis.

Instead, the MARCOS were kept sitting idle and soon thereafter pulled out. The Politicians / Bureaucrats at Delhi did not seem to like the idea of either the Naval Fleet Commander at Mumbai, or the Army Area Commander also, at Mumbai who is actually responsible for providing on call, ‘Aid to Civil Power’ in times of Disasters or Internal Disturbances, or even his senior, the Southern Army Commander, to be in the lime light as coordinators. Political contacts were used to tell these Generals on the site to go back, keep out and keep quiet. Realistically a force as small as the MARCOS there would be led by a Lt. Cmdr. (equivalent to Major Rank) who, given proper orders through his Commander and clearance to act by the designated Civilian Authority, is more than adequately trained to carry out such a clearing
operation and would have been able to complete the operation successfully within a few hours.

The State Director General of Police, already distracted, and his position weakened by a Court Case questioning his very appointment, was unable to stand up and be counted – again perhaps due to Political Interference or Departmental Politics or sheer lack of the Leadership expected? The lack of immediate action permitted the operation to play out longer as a continuing operation on Worldwide TV. Had the MARCOS been allowed to move in immediately, there would have been nothing to discuss or show except the aftermath and that would not have received such continuous coverage. Instead, the coverage would then have been more like the coverage of similar incidents at the other locations (e.g.: Entebbe). This would have been more positive and even caused a deterring effect on our enemies.

Retired Officers from all sorts of Organizations and many so-called theoretical experts were then called upon by the Media, ever hungry to feed the demand for something ‘New – 24/7’, who were quick to air all sorts of opinions and scenarios. Some, informative and realistic, even though only very marginally useful due to lack of concrete facts, but most very imaginative, not really applicable and just plain useless.

All this only served to spread more confusion and more fear.

• Were there only 10 terrorists, or 15, or, as per an early report as many as 40?
• Where were the others? Could we expect more strikes elsewhere?
• WWere these terrorists really trained to ‘Super human’ levels from being near ‘Riff-Raff’, off the streets of small-town Pakistan, with less than a year of sporadic though intense training? OR, were they only the usual sort of suicidal militants, somewhat better trained and working to a more than usually well thought out plan?
• The old injuries and disabilities later found on a couple of them, one missing three fingers of his right hand and the other also, missing fingers of his right hand, were indicative only of a level of ‘adhocism’ in training with explosives and of the exceptional level of their commitment and ‘brain washing/ conditioning’ being the reason for their selection for this operation and not their intelligence or initiative. They were ‘sacrificial goats’ who, thankfully, really could not better use the resources they had and the extra time they were inadvertently given by the slow reaction of our Forces, to create even more havoc.

All concerned should have refrained from according to these terrorists’ higher capabilities than they actually had. The media coverage and the indecision of everyone concerned, displayed for hours, and only presented our Nation in a poor light.

The only thing the Government did right was when they called on a media TV Channel to stop Broadcasting the ‘ranting and ravings’ of a terrorist, who had called the Channel up on the mobiles of some of the hostages/ victims. As what little of what they did broadcast showed, this would only be propaganda and rabble rousing and would serve no one’s purpose but that of the terrorists to glorify themselves.

However, shocking and damaging the Terrorist Operation was, targeting as it did the Land marks in the city, it was in reality a small operation that was finally dealt with by the NSG under a Major’s Command (Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan, who unfortunately was martyred there). The same could actually have also, been done much earlier by the MARCOS available on site if not for the pusillanimous Politicians, Bureaucrats and Police Authorities who refused to put in writing the order for the MACROs to take necessary action, something that they were actually required to do under the Law.

Lack of responsible Leadership was the single biggest lacuna in the entire operation.

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