(IAF) to cut this line and thus starve the enemy troops of both food and ammunition and force their withdrawal, out of an unreasonable fear of Calcutta and Delhi being bombed in reprisal. It should be noted that the Chinese finally declared a unilateral cease fire and withdrew from our territory in the North-East, not out of any good will towards us, but perhaps because of running out of supplies and their recognition of their inability to continue to maintain their lines of supply in the prospect of a prolonged conflict, or even perhaps seeking to bring India to the negotiating table on the boundary issue on their terms and avoiding the issues related to their claims on Tibet.

Chou Enlai on 20 April 1963 again assured Pandit Nehru – “If the Indian Government, owing to its internal or external political requirement, is not prepared to hold negotiations for the time being, the Chinese Government is willing to wait with patience” .

Unfortunately over the decades, all our governments have only followed a policy of avoidance of raising any of the issues, be it Aksai Chin, the McMahon Line, the construction of a Dam and roads in POK, their claims on Arunachal and their negative behavour as regards, stapled Visas, trade or terrorism and now the construction of a hydro-power project across the Brahmaputra, hoping that these would settle themselves over time. This has not earned us any benefits; it has only further encouraged China to spread its influence into Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal, in addition to increasing its support to, and involvement in Pakistan. It is clear that China seeks to humiliate and weaken India and even supports Maoists and Naga rebels in their insurgency within India.

It seeks increased trade with India but it has not reciprocated our policy and allowed import of value-added products from India. Their manufactured products are now flooding our markets to the detriment of the local small industry.

We need to make the Chinese realize that such actions and the attitude that gives rise to them, is against their own long term interests, and also that perhaps this could then encourage us to resort to such a strategy too.

We should also pursue ‘Effects diplomacy’, as Joshua Cooper Ramo terms it, as part of an all encompassing “Grand Strategy” to attain objectives preferably by indirect means. ‘Effects Diplomacy’ and the mutual involvement it encompasses, is better than direct action in most circumstances. ‘Effects diplomacy’ calls for encouraging people to people and cultural contacts, and a mesh of mutual trade pacts and even encouraging the setting up of manufacturing facilities and other assets within our Country by them, to deter their present adversarial strategy of direct action as it could result in greater economic losses to them. Ofcourse such diplomacy takes time to become operative / effective.

If this means we need to pursue even other means to get them to recognize the benefits of working together with us, culturally and commercially,

or even if it calls on us to build alliances with other secular democracies (USA, Japan and Indian ocean and S.E. Asian countries), so be it.

We are today faced with a situation where we have to react to the actions of both China and Pakistan on our North-West Border and China on our North-Eastern Border, and we do not have the luxury of time to build up a comprehensive ‘Effects’ leverage. Today China is vigorously seeking access to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Myanmar respectively and we do not have any direct way to really prevent them from doing so. In such circumstances we should be prepared to negotiate and settle all contentious issues including the boundary issue based on our clear objectives on how to protect our National interests firmly and decisively.

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